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United States v. Lawson: Problems with Presumption in the
Fourth Circuit*
INTRODUCTION
In the month of June 2013, the English version of Wikipedia had
7,971,582,563 page views.' Wikipedia is a free, user-edited online
encyclopedia.2 The site attracts 470 million unique visitors monthly,
and there are more than four million articles written in English
currently on the site.3 These articles contain a wide variety of content,
giving users instant access to the answer to almost any question
imaginable.' The danger that comes with this quick and easy
accessibility is that "[a]nyone with Internet access can write and make
changes to Wikipedia articles."' As a result, it is difficult to tell which
articles are authoritative, which are misleading, and which are flatly
incorrect.6 Some articles have even been subject to vandalism, in
which users have purposely altered articles with false information.' In
spite of the potential inaccuracies, one study found 401 cases in which
courts referenced a Wikipedia article.8 The use of Wikipedia has
* @ 2013 Anna H. Tison.
1. Wikimedia Project at a Glance, WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION (Aug. 5, 2013),
http://stats.wikimedia.org/EN/SummaryEN.htm.
2. Wikipedia: About, WIKIMEDIA FOUNDATION,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWikipedia:About (last modified Aug. 14, 2013, 5:35 PM).
3. Id.
4. Amber Lynn Wagner, Comment, Wikipedia Made Law? The Federal Judicial
Citation of Wikipedia, 26 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 229, 232 (2008)
("Wikipedia contains a wide variety of content, some of which print encyclopedias
normally do not contain, such as current events, popular culture, and slang terms.").
5. Wikipedia: About, supra note 2.
6. See Lee F. Peoples, The Citation of Wikipedia in Judicial Opinions, 12 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 1, 4 (2009) ("Wikipedia expressly makes no guarantee of the validity of the
information it contains."); see also Wikipedia: A Work in Progress, BLOOMBERG
BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 13, 2005), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2005-12-
13/wikipedia-a-work-in-progress (quoting the Wikipedia founder and president of
Wikimedia Foundation, Jimmy Wales, as saying that an article containing significant false
information "slipped through the cracks").
7. Peoples, supra note 6, at 4. For example, in 2005, someone playing a joke on a
coworker edited an article about journalist John Seigenthaler to state that he had been
involved in the assassination of John and Robert Kennedy, which was a complete
fabrication. Id.; see also Wagner, supra note 4, at 233. In fact, Seigenthaler had worked for
Robert Kennedy and had been a pallbearer at his funeral. Peoples, supra note 6, at 4. It
took four months for this false information to be discovered, even though Wikipedia
claims that it corrects vandalism quickly. Id.
8. Peoples, supra note 6, at 6.
2013] LAWSON AND PROBLEMS WITH PRESUMPTION 2245
become so ubiquitous that even the Fourth Circuit in United States v.
Lawson' admitted to citing to it in three prior opinions."o
Changing technology, such as the advent of Wikipedia in 2001,"
has not only impacted judicial opinion writing, but it has also led to an
increase in juror misconduct.12 Although some courts have cited
Wikipedia articles in their opinions, they have not been as accepting
when a juror uses Wikipedia during a trial. For instance, despite the
Fourth Circuit's admission that it had relied on Wikipedia in the past,
the court held in Lawson that a juror's use of Wikipedia to look up an
element of the charged offense was presumptively prejudicial." As a
result, it overturned the defendant's conviction for violating the
Animal Welfare Act.14 In reaching this conclusion, the Fourth Circuit
applied the United States Supreme Court's holding from Remmer v.
United States'" that "any private communication, contact, or
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror" is presumed to be
prejudicial. 6 Despite a circuit split on whether Remmer is still
applicable following the Supreme Court's decisions in Smith v.
Phillips" and United States v. Olano," the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the presumption did apply and that the government had failed to
rebut it.19
This Recent Development argues that the Fourth Circuit should
apply the Remmer presumption more narrowly to encourage finality
9. 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012).
10. Id. at 650 n.28; see Brown v. Nucor Corp., 576 F.3d 149, 156 n.9 (4th Cir. 2009)
(citing Wikipedia as a secondary authority for the meaning of the term "standard
deviation"); United States v. Smith, 275 F. App'x 184, 184 n.1 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting
Wikipedia definition of a "peer-to-peer" computer network); Ordinola v. Hackman, 478
F.3d 588, 593 n.4 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Wikipedia for the definition of "calcium oxide").
11. Wikipedia: About, supra note 2.
12. See Ralph Artigliere, Jim Barton & Bill Hahn, Reining in Juror Misconduct:
Practical Suggestions for Judges and Lawyers, 84 FLA. B.J. 9, 9 (2010) ("To say that
current jurors have enhanced temptation and ability to communicate about the trial with
the outside world is the understatement of this still young century. Jurors have the
capability instantaneously to tweet, blog, text, e-mail, phone, and look up facts and
information during breaks, at home, or even in the jury room if they are allowed to keep
their digital 'windows to the world.' Jury instruction by the judge about communication
outside the courtroom has not kept pace with technology.").
13. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 651. The court found that the government failed to overcome
the presumption of prejudice. Id.
14. Id.
15. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
16. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 641 (quoting Remrnmer, 347 U.S. at 229).
17. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
18. 507 U.S. 725 (1993); see also Lawson, 677 F.3d at 642-44 (discussing the circuit
split).
19. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 651.
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in criminal convictions and to avoid reversals based on minor
technicalities like the one in Lawson. Although Remmer has not been
overruled, the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions have restricted
its scope, partially in recognition of the high threshold that Federal
Rule of Evidence 606(b) demands when the government attempts to
rebut presumptions of prejudice. While juror misconduct remains a
real concern, strict application of Remmer is excessive when
allegations of prejudice revolve around technicalities like a juror's
consultation of Wikipedia for the meaning of a single word. The
application of the Remmer presumption should thus be limited to
cases involving egregious juror misconduct or situations where an
outside influence has injected itself into the jury deliberations in
order to affect the verdict. Further, even if the Fourth Circuit was
correct in applying the Remmer presumption to the facts at issue in
Lawson, the test the court applied makes it nearly impossible for the
government to rebut the presumption, especially in light of the
limitations imposed by Rule 606(b), which prevent jurors from
testifying about the mental processes that went into deciding the
verdict.20 If the Remmer presumption were more limited, the
government would not be required to make a vain attempt to satisfy a
nearly impossible test.
Part I of this Recent Development provides the facts of Lawson
and the trial court's holding. Part II explains the Remmer
presumption and the circuit split on whether it should still be applied
in full force after the Supreme Court's decisions in Phillips and
Olano. Part III provides the Fourth Circuit's reasoning for applying
the Remmer presumption in Lawson and argues that the court
incorrectly concluded that the presumption is applicable to a juror
consulting a dictionary or Wikipedia to define a term. Part III
analyzes the Fourth Circuit's application of the factors identified in
Mayhue v. St. Francis Hospital of Wichita, Inc.,21 which further
indicates the need for a more limited presumption given the difficulty
of rebutting it in light of Rule 606(b).
I. BACKGROUND FACTS AND DISTRICT COURT DECISION IN
UNITED STATES V. LAWSON
In Lawson, Scott Lawson and his codefendants (collectively,
"Lawson") appealed their conviction for "violating, and conspiring to
violate, the animal fighting prohibition of the Animal Welfare Act, 7
20. See infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
21. 969 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1992).
[Vol. 912246
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U.S.C. § 2156(a) ... resulting from their participation in 'gamefowl
derbies,' otherwise known as 'cockfighting.' "I The defendants'
convictions were based on their participation in cockfighting events in
South Carolina in July 2008 and April 2009.1 Scott Lawson allegedly
offered gaffs-sharp instruments that are attached to a bird's leg in a
cockfight 24-for sale and sharpened gaffs for individuals who entered
birds into the event.25 Another defendant, Peeler, allegedly was a
referee at a cockfighting event in April 2009, and the indictment
against Lawson and Peeler alleged that they had "sponsored and
exhibited an animal, or aided and abetted individuals who sponsored
an animal, in an animal fighting venture that occurred in July 2008,
and April 2009, respectively." 26 There was a separate indictment for
three other defendants, alleging that they also participated in an
unlawful animal fighting venture.27 All of the defendants were
indicted on conspiracy charges stemming from an undercover
investigation by the South Carolina Department of Natural
Resources ("SCDNR") of cockfighting "derbies." 28  During its
investigation, the SCDNR sent undercover officers to these events
who made video recordings of the derbies held in July 2008 and April
2009.29 They discovered that at these cockfighting derbies, birds were
equipped with gaffs or other sharp metal objects attached to their legs
and were entered into matches in which "[t]he birds fought their
opponent to the death or at least until one of the birds was physically
incapable of continuing to fight."30
22. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 633 (citing Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a) (2006 &
Supp. 2011)). While this case dealt with several issues raised by the defendants on appeal,
this Recent Development focuses solely on the issue of the alleged juror misconduct
resulting from a juror looking up an element of the crime on Wikipedia. In addition to the
juror misconduct issue, the court held that the animal fighting statute was enacted within
Congress's Commerce Clause powers, that the statute's provision of different elements of
the crime in jurisdictions where animal fighting is permitted did not violate defendant's
equal protection rights, and that the district court did not err by joining the trials of
Lawson and his co-defendants. Id. at 634.
23. Id. at 634. Several defendants were also convicted of participating in an illegal
gambling business, and those convictions were upheld in Lawson. Id.
24. See Tracy Bateman Farrell, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of
Statutes and Ordinances to Prosecution for Cockfighting, 69 A.L.R. 6th 207 (2011).
25. Id.; see also Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(e) (2006 & Supp. 2011) ("It shall
be unlawful for any person to knowingly sell, buy, transport, or deliver in interstate or
foreign commerce a knife, a gaff, or any other sharp instrument attached, or designed or
intended to be attached, to the leg of a bird for use in an animal fighting venture.").
26. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 634.
27. Id. at 634-35.
28. Id. at 635.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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The district court consolidated the indictments so that all the
defendants were tried together."1 After a five-day trial, the jury found
the defendants guilty on all counts.32 However, six days later, one of
the jurors informed a courtroom security officer that Juror 177 had
consulted the Internet the morning before the jury reached its
verdict.3 3 While searching the Internet, Juror 177 looked up the
definition of "sponsor" on Wikipedia.34 Under the animal fighting
statute, if the defendant lives in a jurisdiction where gamefowl
fighting is prohibited, the government has to prove that the defendant
"sponsored or exhibited an animal in an animal fighting venture,"
making the word "sponsor" a key element of the offense." Juror 177
printed out the definition and brought the printout to the jury room,
where he shared it with the jury foreperson.36 He attempted to show
the printout to other jurors as well, but they refused to look at the
printout, stating that it was inappropriate to view the material
because it would be a violation of the jury instructions that "had
admonished the jurors not to conduct any outside research about the
case, including research on the internet."37
Nineteen days after the jury reached its verdict, the district court
held a hearing to determine whether Juror 177's actions had unfairly
prejudiced the defendants." By the time of the hearing, Juror 177 no
longer possessed the original printout and instead provided the
district court with a recently updated version of the Wikipedia page."
Noting that this definition was different from the material Juror 177
produced during jury deliberations, the district court explained that
the documents provided to the court for the hearing were "recreated"
after the trial.40 The court was "nonetheless[] persuaded that the
definitions found on [the exhibit were] in essentially the same form as
31. Id.
32. Id. at 635-36.
33. Id. at 639.
34. Id. It should be noted that the statute does not define "sponsor" in either the
section at issue or in the definitions section. Animal welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 2132, 2156
(2006 & Supp. 2011). Also, the district court did not provide a definition of the word to the
jury, even though it is an element of the crime. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 647 n.24.
35. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 637 (citing Animal Welfare Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2156(a)(1)).
36. Id. at 639.
37. Id. at 639-40.
38. Id. at 640.
39. Id.
40. Id.
[Vol. 912248
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those brought in by Juror 177, although there ha[d] been at least
some change to the Wikipedia definition of 'sponsor.' "41
During the hearing, Juror 177 admitted to conducting Internet
research and bringing it into the jury room during deliberations;
however, he denied sharing it with anyone other than Juror 185 and
said he did not recall any of the other jurors saying it would be
improper to consider outside materials. 42 Despite Juror 177's
testimony, there was some discrepancy among the other jurors as to
how much Juror 177 had shared his research with them.43 The district
court concluded that Juror 177 "may have orally shared some portion
of the definition with the other jurors.""
The district court applied the factors set forth in Mayhue v. St.
Francis Hospital of Wichita, Inc.45 to determine whether Juror 177's
misconduct prejudiced Lawson.46 Mayhue is a Tenth Circuit decision,
but the Fourth Circuit previously employed these factors in McNeill
v. Polk,47 which involved a habeas corpus appeal where a juror had
referenced a dictionary.48 In his concurring opinion in McNeill, Judge
King stated that the Supreme Court offered no clear test for when an
extraneous influence might prejudice a juror, so he looked to the
Tenth Circuit's Mayhue factors to provide clarity.49 The district court
in Lawson relied on the concurring opinion in McNeill to support its
decision to apply the Mayhue factors.so The factors, as stated in
Lawson, include:
The importance of the word or phrase being defined to the
resolution of the case.
41. Id. (quoting United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295s-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at
*17 n.14 (D.S.C. July 19,2010), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 641. At least one juror testified that Juror 177 had shared the information
with Juror 185 as well as other jurors, and three jurors testified that they saw Juror 177
"produce, or attempt to produce, the printed deliberations to share with the jury before he
was told by the group that using the material would be inappropriate." Id. Further, six
jurors testified that they heard Juror 177 discuss the fact that he had conducted the
Internet research about a term at issue in the case. Id.
44. Id. (quoting United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295s-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at
*11 (D.S.C. July 19, 2010), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629).
45. 969 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1992).
46. United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295s-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *13 (D.S.C.
July 19, 2010) (citing Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 924), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. Lawson,
677 F.3d 629.
47. 476 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 2007).
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id. at 226 (King, J., concurring) (citing Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 924).
50. Dyal, 2010 WL 2854292, at *13 (citing Mayhue, 969 F.2d at 924).
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The extent to which the dictionary definition differs from the
jury instructions or from the proper legal definition.
The extent to which the jury discussed and emphasized the
definition.
The strength of the evidence and whether the jury had difficulty
reaching a verdict prior to introduction of the dictionary
definition.
Any other factors that relate to a determination of prejudice.'
The district court concluded that the first factor could indicate
prejudice because the term "sponsor" was important to the case
against Lawson.52 However, the court found the second factor favored
the government because, although the meaning of "sponsor" was
taken from a lengthy Wikipedia discussion on the subject, it was
"consistent with the definition that the court would have provided
had it been asked for a definition."" The third factor also favored the
government because the court concluded that the jurors who did see
the definition gave little emphasis to it, and the other jurors barely
recalled what word had been referenced.54 In analyzing the fourth
factor, the district court reasoned:
As to the definitions of "sponsor" and "exhibit," it is significant
that each of the Defendants could be convicted not only for his
or her own activities, but (depending on the charge) for
conspiring with or aiding and abetting others in exhibiting or
sponsoring an animal in an animal fighting venture. There was
strong evidence both of conspiracy and aiding and abetting as
to each of the Defendants tried."
In assessing the fifth factor, the district court did not find any
other factors that related to a determination of prejudice.56 Because
the definition procured by Juror 177 was consistent with the jury's
understanding of the term on the first day of deliberations, and Juror
177 looked up the term to satisfy his own curiosity about whether
"sponsor" could have multiple meanings, the court concluded that the
research did "constitute[] an improper external influence but [was]
not prejudicial per se" and that there was "no reasonable possibility
51. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 646 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Mayhue v. St.
Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 924 (10th Cir. 1992)).
52. Dyal, 2010 WL 2854292, at *15.
53. Id.
54. Id. at *16.
55. Id. at *17.
56. Id.
2250 [Vol. 91
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that the external influence caused actual prejudice."" As a result, the
court denied Lawson's motion for a new trial."
II. THE REMMER PRESUMPTION
In Remmer, decided in 1954, the defendant was convicted by a
jury for tax evasion.5 9 After the jury returned its guilty verdict, the
defendant learned that during the trial, an unnamed individual
remarked to a juror, who later became the jury foreman, that "he
could profit by bringing in a verdict favorable to the [defendant]."60
The juror reported the communication to the judge, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation investigated the incident and reported that
the statement was "made in jest" and "nothing further was done or
said about the matter."" The defendant moved for a new trial,
claiming that the extraneous communication with the juror prejudiced
him; the district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals
affirmed.62 In a brief opinion, the Supreme Court remanded the case
and ordered the district court to conduct a hearing to determine
whether the defendant was prejudiced.6 3 In addition to ordering the
hearing, the Court instructed that "[i]n a criminal case, any private
communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a
juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for
obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial."'
The Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Phillips and Olano
seemingly indicated the Court's intention to narrow the Remmer
presumption, without expressly overruling it.65 In Phillips, the alleged
prejudice resulted from a juror submitting a job application with the
District Attorney's Office during the trial.66 The juror learned about
the position from a friend, who had inquired on the juror's behalf
without mentioning his name or the fact that he was serving on the
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 229.
63. Id. at 230.
64. Id. at 229.
65. See Eva Kerr, Note, Prejudice, Procedure, and a Proper Presumption: Restoring
the Remmer Presumption of Prejudice in Order to Protect Criminal Defendants' Sixth
Amendment Rights, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1451, 1458 (2008); see also Bennett L. Gershman,
Contaminating the Verdict: The Problem of Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 327
(2005) ("The continuing viability of Remmer's 'presumption of prejudice' test when jurors
have been subjected to extra-judicial contacts has been questioned.").
66. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 212 (1982).
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jury in the respondent's trial.67 The office received the application but
made no contact with the juror during the trial."8 The potential
concern here was that the juror would favor his potential employer in
the trial, believing a guilty verdict would help his chances for
obtaining employment with the prosecutor's office.6 9 The Court
nonetheless held that "due process does not require a new trial every
time a juror has been placed in a potentially compromising situation.
Were that the rule, few trials would be constitutionally acceptable.""
The Court implied that it was the defendant who should have the
burden to prove actual bias at a Remmer-type hearing in which it
would be determined if the defendant was prejudiced, rather than
requiring the government to rebut a presumption of unfair
prejudice." Such an implication would seemingly contadict its
previous holding in Remmer, in which the Court stated "the burden
rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and
hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was
harmless to the defendant."7 2 As one commentator pointed out, "[t]he
Court purported to apply the Remmer standard, but the Court's
description of the Remmer hearing departed from Remmer's
automatic presumption of prejudice."" Several years later, in Olano,
the Court declined to presume prejudice in a case where alternate
jurors remained in the jury room during deliberations, noting that
"[t]here may be cases where an intrusion should be presumed
prejudicial, but a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific
analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect
the jury's deliberations and thereby its verdict?"7 4
The Court's holdings in these two cases have led the circuit
courts to struggle with the issue of when to apply a presumption of
prejudice rather than analyze the prejudice on a case-by-case basis."
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 229 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 217 (majority opinion).
71. See id. at 215 ("Given the human propensity for self-justification, respondent
argues, the law must impute bias to jurors in Smith's position. We disagree.").
72. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (citing Mattox v. United
States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-50 (1892); Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir.
1943)).
73. Kerr, supra note 65, at 1459-60.
74. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 739 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
75. See Kerr, supra note 65, at 1461; see also Gershman, supra note 65, at 328 ("If a
court chooses not to apply a presumption of prejudice, then the court would evaluate the
severity of the suspected intrusion, and only if the court determines that prejudice is likely
would the government be required to prove its absence.").
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Six circuits-including the Fourth Circuit-have held that the
Remmer presumption remains fully intact after Phillips and Olano."6
However, even though the First and Third Circuits agree that the
presumption should still be applied, these circuits conditionally apply
the presumption.77 The First Circuit applies the presumption " 'only
where there is an egregious tampering or third party communication
which directly injects itself into the jury process.' "' Similarly, the
Third Circuit applies the presumption "only when the extraneous
information is of a considerably serious nature."79 Specifically, the
Third Circuit has stated that it tends to apply the presumption only in
situations where a third party has directly contacted a juror, and it
tends not to apply the presumption where a juror has been exposed to
a media report, such as a newspaper article." In contrast, four circuits
have declined to apply the presumption, citing Phillips and Olano as
the basis for their conclusion. The Fifth Circuit held that Philips and
Olano rejected the Remmer presumption and stated that "the trial
court must first assess the severity of the suspected intrusion; only
when the court determines that prejudice is likely should the
76. The Fourth Circuit cites several cases to indicate the five circuits that align with its
position. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing United States v.
Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 828 (7th Cir. 2011) ("In a criminal case, any private communication,
contact, or tampering-directly or indirectly-with a juror during a trial about the matter
pending before the jury is presumptively prejudicial."); United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d
1273, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that if the defendant establishes that the jury has been
exposed to extrinsic evidence or contacts, "prejudice is presumed and the burden shifts to
the government to rebut the presumption"); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 173 (2d
Cir. 2002) (citing Remmer for the proposition that "[ilt is well-settled that any extra-record
information of which a juror becomes aware is presumed prejudicial" and that "[a]
government showing that the information is harmless will overcome this presumption");
United States v. Dutkel, 192 F.3d 893, 895-96 (9th Cir. 1999) (applying the Remmer
presumption in a jury tampering case and disagreeing that the presumption has been
abrogated); Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 922 (10th Cir.
1992) ("The law in the Tenth Circuit is clear. A rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises
whenever a jury is exposed to external information in contravention of a district court's
instructions.").
77. Circuit Split on Application of Remmer Juror Misconduct Presumption, FED.
EVIDENCE REV. (Apr. 23, 2012), http://federalevidence.com/node/1464; see also United
States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 287-88 (1st Cir. 2002) (observing that the Remmer
presumption is still applicable in First Circuit "only where there is an egregious tampering
or third party communication which directly injects itself into the jury process" (citation
omitted)); United States v. Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2001) (applying presumption
of prejudice when a jury is exposed to extraneous information "of a considerably serious
nature").
78. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 288 (quoting United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 261 (1st
Cir. 1990)).
79. Lloyd, 269 F.3d at 238.
80. Id. at 238-39.
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government be required to prove its absence."s" The Eighth Circuit
and the D.C. Circuit have taken similar stances.82 The Sixth Circuit
has rejected the Remmer presumption in all situations and placed the
burden on the defendant to prove prejudice.
As the circuit split indicates, the Supreme Court did not provide
much clarity in Phillips and Olano about when the Remmer
presumption should apply.' Nonetheless, by declining to apply the
presumption in those cases, the Court indicated its intention to
narrow Remmer's application. There are several possible explanations
for the shift. One possible explanation, which supports the narrowing
of the Remmer presumption, is that the Court intended to promote
more finality in criminal convictions." Especially in cases such as
Lawson where the court discovered alleged juror misconduct after
the verdict, courts are generally reluctant to bring the jury back in to
probe for potential misconduct." In Tanner v. United States," the
Supreme Court stated that "[a]llegations of juror misconduct,
incompetency, or inattentiveness, raised for the first time days, weeks,
or months after the verdict, seriously disrupt the finality of the
process."" Additionally, courts should be concerned that postverdict
inquiries may inhibit the jury's discussions during deliberations.8 9 The
Supreme Court stated in Tanner that "full and frank discussion in the
jury room, jurors' willingness to return an unpopular verdict, and the
community's trust in a system that relies on the decisions of laypeople
would all be undermined by a barrage of postverdict scrutiny of juror
81. United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998).
82. See United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (holding
that Phillips and Olano narrowed the Remmer presumption and that trial courts must
determine whether a particular intrusion showed "likelihood of prejudice," which would
place on the government the burden of proving harmlessness); United States v. Blumeyer,
62 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 1995) (citing Olano for the proposition that the defendant has
the burden to prove actual prejudice in cases involving extrinsic juror contact pertaining to
issues of law, but not to issues of fact).
83. See United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95 (6th Cir. 1988) ("This court has
consistently held that Smith v. Phillips reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of
showing bias to the defendant rather than placing a heavy burden on the government to
show that an unauthorized contact was harmless.").
84. See Kerr, supra note 65, at 1461 (noting that the circuit courts have struggled to
reconcile the Supreme Court's inconsistent decisions); see also John J. Bonacum, III,
Significant Development, Smith v. Phillips: Misconduct By or Affecting a Juror in a
Criminal Prosecution, 62 B.U. L. REV. 361, 381 (1982) (suggesting that the Phillips
decision has increased the confusion already present in misconduct cases).
85. See Bonacum, supra note 84, at 384.
86. See Gershman, supra note 65, at 326.
87. 483 U.S. 107 (1987).
88. Id. at 120.
89. See Gershman, supra note 65, at 326.
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conduct."" While it is prudent to apply a presumption of prejudice in
cases involving serious jury tampering, "applying an inflexible
presumption in cases of technical, trivial, and arguably insignificant
although improper transgressions, may be an excessive and
unjustifiable response."91
Another possible explanation for the Supreme Court's decision
to narrow the Remmer presumption is the enactment of Federal Rule
of Evidence 606(b) in 1975.1 Rule 606(b) prohibits a juror from
testifying about his mental processes in reaching a verdict, but makes
an exception for testimony about "whether extraneous prejudicial
information was improperly brought to the jury's attention [or] any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror.""
With the enactment of Rule 606(b), it has become very difficult for
the government to overcome any presumption of prejudice.94 In fact,
both the D.C. Circuit and the Tenth Circuit have suggested that the
adoption of the rule necessitates narrowing the Remmer
presumption." In deciding Remmer, the Supreme Court may not have
anticipated that the government would be required to overcome such
a high-or potentially impossible-burden in order to rebut the
presumption. This might explain why the Supreme Court may have
intended Phillips and Olano to narrow the Remmer presumption to
apply only in situations involving egregious jury tampering, while in
other cases the defendant still has the opportunity, and will bear the
burden, to prove actual bias." Thus, although the Supreme Court may
have intended to narrow the presumption of prejudice, it did not
intend to do away with it completely. The presumption will still be
90. Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120-21.
91. Gershman, supra note 65, at 327-28.
92. An Act to Establish Rules of Evidence for Certain Courts and Proceedings, Pub.
L. No. 93-595, § 606(b), 88 Stat. 1926, 1934 (1975) (codified at FED. R. EVID. 606(b)).
93. Id.; see also United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(citing Tanner, 483 U.S. at 116-27) ("The exception for improper outside influence allows
testimony about the fact and nature of the contact (the input, as it were), but not about the
effect it produced on the juror's state of mind.").
94. See Kerr, supra note 65, at 1458.
95. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 496 ("[I]f the Remmer presumption applied in full
force, Rule 606(b) would generally make it difficult or impossible to overcome a
presumption of prejudice once a jury had reached its verdict and a third-party contact
were shown."); United States v. Greer, 620 F.2d 1383, 1385 & n.1 (10th Cir. 1980) (stating
that "[t]he effect of the Rule is that a presumption of prejudice cannot be overcome once a
jury has reached its verdict," and that "[t]his effect ... may require the courts to narrow
the definition of 'presumptively prejudicial' found in Remmer").
96. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982) ("This Court has long held that the
remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the
opportunity to prove actual bias.").
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triggered by cases involving egregious misconduct or in situations in
which an extraneous influence purposefully injects itself into the jury
deliberations in order to bias the jury.
III. FOURTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION AND RATIONALE IN LAWSON
A. Application of the Remmer Presumption
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and
granted Lawson a new trial.' In reaching this decision, the court
applied the Remmer presumption, holding that the government failed
to rebut the presumption under the Mayhue factors." Notably, the
district court did not address Lawson's argument that he was entitled
to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice under Remmer.99 In fact, the
district court cited a Fourth Circuit case to indicate that a juror's
reference to a home dictionary is not "prejudicial per se."'Io
While other circuits have held that the Remmer presumption
should no longer be applied after Phillips and Olano,'0' according to
Lawson, the presumption "remains live and well in the Fourth
Circuit." 102 The court based its conclusion on three other cases-
Stockton v. Virginia,03 United States v. Cheek,'" and United States v.
Bashamo-in which it applied the Remmer presumption to situations
involving external influences on a jury's deliberations.106
In Stockton, the court expressly held that Phillips did not
overturn the Remmer holding and therefore applied the Remmer
presumption where a restaurant owner commented to jury members
dining at the restaurant during sentencing deliberations that he
thought " 'they ought to fry the son of a bitch.' "107 Even after Olano,
the Fourth Circuit applied the Remmer presumption in Cheek and
97. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 651 (4th Cir. 2012).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 641.
100. United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *13 (D.S.C.
July 19, 2010) (citing McNeill v. Polk, 476 F.3d 206, 225 (4th Cir. 2007) (King, J.,
concurring)), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629.
101. See supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
102. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 642.
103. 852 F.2d 740 (4th Cir. 1988).
104. 94 F.3d 136 (4th Cir. 1996).
105. 561 F.3d 302 (4th Cir. 2009).
106. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 642-43.
107. Stockton, 852 F.2d at 743-44. In concluding that the government failed to rebut
the presumption, the Stockton court described the circumstances of the comment to the
jury, noting that it was clearly impactful on the jurors and that it was relevant to the exact
issue on which the jury was deliberating-whether to impose the death penalty. Id. at 746.
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Basham. In Cheek, the court granted the defendant a new trial based
on the attempted bribery of a juror, 08 stating that "once a defendant
introduces evidence that there was an extrajudicial communication
that was 'more than innocuous,' the Remmer presumption is
'triggered automatically,' and '[t]he burden then shifts to the
[government] to prove that there exists no reasonable possibility that
the jury's verdict was influenced by an improper communication.' "1
Basham involved a juror who contacted various media outlets prior to
receiving jury instructions and before the jury began deliberating."o
The court applied the Remmer presumption but concluded that the
government had rebutted it, basing its decision on the fact that the
phone calls were brief and that the media outlets had not provided
any information to the juror.' Taking these cases together, Lawson
demonstrated the Fourth Circuit's continuing adherence to the
Remmer presumption, even after Phillips and Olano."2
Next, the court addressed the issue of whether the Remmer
presumption is applicable to a situation in which a juror looked up a
key term on Wikipedia, recognizing that this is a different type of
situation than its previous applications where allegations of jury
tampering or a juror's contact with a third party were involved." 3 The
court had previously addressed a juror's use of a dictionary as
misconduct but had never considered whether a rebuttable
presumption of prejudice should apply under those circumstances." 4
In resolving the question, the court noted a circuit split on the issue of
whether to apply the rebuttable presumption to the unauthorized use
of a dictionary during jury deliberations and found a clear pattern.1 s
The same courts that maintain that the Remmer presumption should
continue to be applied have also found the presumption applicable to
a juror's dictionary use.u6 Similarly, the courts that decline to apply
108. Cheek, 94 F.3d at 138.
109. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 642 (alterations in original) (quoting Cheek, 94 F.3d at 141
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
110. Basham, 561 F.3d at 316-17.
111. Id. at 320-21. While the court said it would look at a "variety of factors," it did not
cite the five Mayhue factors, and it seemed to base its conclusion only on the "extent of
the communication," which it identified as the "most important factor." Id. at 320.
112. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 642-43.
113. Id. at 644.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 645.
116. Id. (citing United States v. Aguirre, 108 F.3d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 1997) (applying
the Mayhue factors to determine whether the government rebutted the presumption of
prejudice that arose from a juror's use of a dictionary); United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d
543, 550 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that once the defendant proves extrinsic contact with the
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the presumption with regard to dictionary use have held that the
rebuttable presumption no longer applies.' In concluding that the
presumption was applicable to a juror conducting unauthorized
research on Wikipedia, the court relied on its prior application of the
Remmer presumption and stated that "many of the concerns that
arise when a juror discusses a case with a third party ... are likewise
concerns inherent in a juror's unauthorized use of a dictionary during
jury deliberations.""' Additionally, the court noted that a great
concern under the specific facts of this case was that the term
researched was an element of the crime for which Lawson was on
trial."9
As the Fourth Circuit pointed out in Lawson, "[tihe continued
vitality of Remmer in this Circuit, however, does not resolve the
question whether the presumption is applicable in cases involving a
juror's unauthorized use of Wikipedia." 20 Arguably, the Remmer
court did not intend for this type of juror misconduct to be subject to
a rebuttable presumption of prejudice because it does not involve an
extraneous communication between a juror and an outside party.'2 '
Moreover, even if this view of Remmer is too narrow, given the
Supreme Court's narrowing of the Remmer presumption in Phillips
and Olano, the Fourth Circuit should not have applied it to the
circumstances of this case. Remmer involved a situation where an
unknown individual contacted a juror, saying that the juror could
profit by entering a verdict in favor of the defendant.'22 The Fourth
Circuit acknowledged up front that "an allegation of jury tampering
jury, including the juror's use of a dictionary, the government has the burden to overcome
the presumption of prejudice); Marino v. Vasquez, 812 F.2d 499, 505 (9th Cir. 1987)
(holding that "unauthorized reference to dictionary definitions constitutes reversible error
which the State must prove harmless beyond a reasonable doubt")).
117. Id. (citing United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(refusing to apply a rebuttable presumption to a juror's reading of a dictionary definition
during deliberations); United States v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[I]f
members of the jury in fact used the dictionary definition [to reach their verdict], the
defendant must prove that he was prejudiced thereby; prejudice is not presumed.");
United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566, 568 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that if "the jury
simply supplements the [trial] court's instructions of law with definitions culled from a
dictionary, it remains within the province of the judge to determine" whether the
defendant was prejudiced)).
118. Id. at 645-46.
119. Id. at 646.
120. Id. at 644.
121. See United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 288 (1st Cir. 2002) (discussing why
Remmer is inapplicable where the presence of a potentially prejudicial document was
inadvertently left in the jury room).
122. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 228 (1954).
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or of a juror's contact with a third party ... is of a much different
character than a juror's unauthorized use of a dictionary during jury
deliberations."' 23 Prior to Lawson, the Fourth Circuit had not
addressed the precise issue of whether the unauthorized use of a
dictionary gives rise to the presumption of prejudice.2 4 However,
among other circuits, a split developed regarding this issue, which
exhibited a clear pattern.lu A number of circuits have held that the
use of a dictionary does not automatically give rise to a presumption
of prejudice.2 6
In Remmer, the Court stated:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or
tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial
about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious
reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in
pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and
directions of the court made during the trial, with full
knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive,
but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish,
after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact
with the juror was harmless to the defendant. 27
Although this case was decided long before the invention of
Wikipedia,28 and thus the Court clearly did not contemplate it in
making this statement in Remmer, nothing in its opinion indicates
that the Court specifically contemplated that the use of dictionaries
should give rise to a presumption of prejudice either. The Court is
referring to external forces that communicate, contact, or tamper with
the jurors.'29 Those are obviously very different situations from the
123. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 644.
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
126. See, e.g., United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 502-03 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(holding that the defendant has the burden to show prejudice where a juror read a
dictionary definition during deliberations to persuade jurors to convict); United States v.
Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1995) ("[I]f members of the jury in fact used the
dictionary definition [to reach their verdict], the defendant must prove that he was
prejudiced thereby; prejudice is not presumed."); United States v. Cheyenne, 855 F.2d 566,
568 (8th Cir. 1988) (stating that where "the jury simply supplements the [trial] court's
instructions of law with definitions culled from a dictionary, it remains within the province
of the judge to determine" whether this conduct prejudiced the defendant).
127. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229 (citing Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 148-50
(1892); Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 1943)).
128. See supra text accompanying note 11.
129. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 501 ("Indeed, on its face Remmer refers only to a
'private communication, contact, or tampering' with a juror." (quoting Remmer, 347 U.S.
at 229)).
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case of a juror looking up a term on Wikipedia. This distinction alone
provides a strong argument against applying the Remmer
presumption to the facts of Lawson.
On the other hand, even if Remmer was intended to apply a
rebuttable presumption to all extraneous influences on the jury, the
holdings in Phillips and Olano sufficiently narrowed the Remmer
presumption so that it should be applied only in limited
circumstances. In Phillips, the Court refused to apply the
presumption where a juror had direct contact with the District
Attorney's Office, through the submission of a job application.3 0
Olano involved alternate jurors sitting in the jury room during
deliberations, which arguably would be considered an external
influence on the jury, yet the Court refused to apply a presumption of
prejudice in that case.13'
But what about a dictionary? The Fourth Circuit has held that it
will apply the presumption automatically when a defendant
introduces evidence that an extraneous influence on the jury was
" 'more than innocuous.' "132 Thus, the question is whether the use of
a dictionary is innocuous. In this case, Juror 177 looked up a term that
was an element of the crime at issue, which was particularly troubling
to the court and ultimately factored prominently into its conclusion
that the use of Wikipedia in this case was more than innocuous.133 The
fact that the Wikipedia definition was three pages long-far more
detailed than the definition the court would have provided if
requested by the jury-also weighed heavily in the court's
reasoning. 3 4 However, in a world in which people are used to having
information at their fingertips, it is unsurprising that a juror might
resort to looking up a term on Wikipedia without contemplating the
130. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 220-21 (1982).
131. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 737 (1993).
132. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 642 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States
v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th Cir. 1996)).
133. Id. at 646.
134. See id. at 648 ("The Wikipedia entry for that term reviewed by the district court is
three pages long, and contains a thirteen-paragraph 'definition' that reads more like a
narrative than a definition. This Wikipedia entry also contained a three-paragraph section
titled 'sponsorship controversies,' as well as internal and external 'weblinks.' Thus, even if
some part of the Wikipedia entry is not in direct substantive conflict with traditional legal
definitions of the term 'sponsor,' the expansive nature of that Wikipedia entry suggests
that '[t]he extent to which the [Wikipedia] definition differs from the proper legal
definition' likely is significant." (alterations in original) (quoting Mayhue v. St. Francis
Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 924 (10th Cir. 1992))).
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possibility of a mistrial.135 While the court may have been correct in
deciding that the use of Wikipedia, based on its user-generated
content, was presumptively prejudicial, extending this conclusion to
the use of a regular dictionary is problematic.13 6 While a dictionary
provides a short reference to a term, "Internet search engines and
special Web sites give jurors the tools to conduct extensive
investigations about parties, their attorneys, and the very subject
matter of any given lawsuit."'37 Further, unlike an ordinary dictionary,
"the Internet is virtually boundless, ever-changing and, for the most
part, not susceptible to authentication.""' These two types of media
should not be treated by the courts as if they are the same.
What the court also fails to recognize is that in holding that the
use of Wikipedia is presumptively prejudicial, courts in the Fourth
Circuit will likely be faced with more mistrials 39 because the test-at
least as applied in Lawson-makes it nearly impossible for the
government to rebut the Remmer presumption.'40 The Fourth Circuit
should not apply the presumption to the use of a dictionary due to the
difficulty, in light of Rule 606(b), of rebutting the presumption by
showing that the jury was not actually prejudiced. During the
postverdict hearing, Juror 177 testified that "he gave little emphasis
to the definition in deciding the case."14' But, in light of Rule 606(b),
the court cannot consider the mental processes of the jurors during
deliberations.'42 Thus, it is difficult to see how the government could
rebut the presumption without being able to delve into how, if at all,
the outside influence affected the jury's decision-making process. This
135. See Gareth S. Lacy, Untangling the Web: How Courts Should Respond to Juries
Using the Internet for Research, 1 REYNOLDS CT. & MEDIA L.J. 169, 169 (2011) ("With
nearly 58 million U.S. cell-phone users accessing the mobile Internet on a daily basis, it is
critical that courts respond quickly and effectively to [the] increased use of the Internet
during trial.").
136. Jonathan M. Redgrave, Unplugging Jurors from the Internet, 48 FED. LAW. 19, 20
(2001) (positing that there is a greater potential for prejudice when a juror starts surfing
the Internet rather than merely referencing a dictionary).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See Lacy, supra note 135, at 169 ("Courts have been wholly unprepared for this
new wave of immediate access to useful information. In recent years, several courts have
ordered mistrials after discovering jurors had accessed Wikipedia or conducted other
Internet research during trial.").
140. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
141. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 649 (4th Cir. 2012).
142. See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) ("[A] juror may not testify as to any matter or statement
occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon
that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the jury to assent to or dissent
from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in connection
therewith.").
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could mean that-absent more careful jury instructions about not
using the Internet-mistrials will be more likely to occur.143
Alternatively, it is likewise difficult to see how the defendant could
prove prejudice without being able to show that the verdict was
actually biased by the outside information.1" Rather than declaring
mistrials every time a juror conducts Internet research about a case,
the better practice would be to educate the jurors about why Internet
research is not allowed in order to prevent the misconduct in the first
place. 45
Because of the time and money spent on retrials, 46 courts should
consider whether a jury has been prejudiced by an external influence
on a case-by-case basis rather than automatically applying a
presumption of prejudice and forcing the government to make a
nearly futile attempt to rebut it. Although it is important to recognize
the possibility of inconsistent results if it is within the sole discretion
of the trial courts to determine if prejudice is likely, rather than
applying the potentially more consistent automatic presumption,147 a
case-by-case approach would avoid providing a retrial for an
obviously guilty defendant based on a minor technicality. The district
court in Lawson held that the evidence against the defendants for
both conspiracy and aiding and abetting was strong. 148 The Fourth
Circuit did not disagree with this conclusion but noted that the district
court was focusing on the evidence for the aiding and abetting theory
of liability, and because of Rule 606(b), there was no way to know
whether the jury convicted based on this theory. 149
143. See Artigliere et al., supra note 12, at 10-14.
144. See Catherine (Katie) Gleeson, Note, To Presume or Not to Presume Prejudice?
Kilgore v. Fuji Heavy Industries Changes the Way New Mexico Analyzes Juror
Misconduct, 41 N.M. L. REV. 501, 531 (2011) ("No matter who bears the burden of
proving that an extraneous communication probably prejudiced the jury, the fact remains
that parties have an arduous task of proving anything in light of Rule 606(b)'s prohibition
against jurors testifying as to the effect that extraneous information had on their mental
processes or deliberations.").
145. For a thorough explanation of how judges should educate jurors about Internet
research to prevent misconduct, see Artigliere et al., supra note 12, at 10-14.
146. See Amanda McGee, Note, Juror Misconduct in the Twenty-First Century: The
Prevalence of the Internet and its Effect on American Courtrooms, 30 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.
REV. 301, 306-07 (2010) (discussing the enormous costs of mistrials as a result of juror
misconduct).
147. See Kerr, supra note 65, at 1482 ("Granting courts complete discretion to decide
when to apply a presumption of prejudice has led and will continue to lead to inconsistent
results.").
148. United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *17 (D.S.C.
July 19, 2010), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629 (4th
Cir. 2012).
149. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 649 (4th Cir. 2012).
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B. Application of the Mayhue Factors
Finally, the court applied the Mayhue factors to determine
whether the government had rebutted the presumption of prejudice,
and after analyzing each of the five factors at length, held that the
government had not met its burden."'o With regard to the first factor,
"the importance of the word or term at issue to the resolution of the
case," the court found that it weighed heavily in favor of Lawson,
since "sponsor" was an element of the offense.' The court disagreed
with the district court's conclusion that the second factor weighed in
favor of the government because the Wikipedia definition was three
pages long, which almost certainly contained "more information than
any traditional legal definition of the term," and it had been changed
since Juror 177 had originally printed it.'52 The court said meaningful
analysis of this factor was impossible because it had no way of
knowing exactly what the jury had referenced as the definition of
"sponsor."Is In analyzing the third factor, the court said it could not
be certain how much the jury used the definition, so it concluded that
this factor weighed in favor of Lawson, given the government's
burden to rebut the presumption.'54 The fourth factor deals with the
strength of the evidence against the defendant and whether the jury
was having trouble coming to a consensus before the definition was
introduced into deliberations.' 5 The court conceded that it could not
say that the jury was having difficulty in reaching a verdict before
Juror 177 introduced the "sponsor" definition based on the timeline
of deliberations; however, when balanced with the lack of evidence
presented by the government on the theory of liability involving the
element of sponsorship, the court concluded the factor was either "in
equipoise or weigh[ed] in favor of Lawson," despite the possibility
that the jury convicted Lawson on a different theory of liability.'"'
The final Mayhue factor is a catch-all factor that incorporates
anything else that relates to a finding of prejudice.' In finding that
this factor weighed in Lawson's favor, the court focused on the open-
access nature of Wikipedia and said that "the danger in relying on a
Wikipedia entry is obvious and real.""5 ' It also cited to other federal
150. Id. at 651.
151. Id. at 647.
152. Id. at 648.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 649.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 649-50.
157. Id. at 650.
158. Id.
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cases where courts had expressed concerns about Wikipedia's lack of
reliability.159
In concluding its analysis of the Mayhue factors, the court
recognized that there are unresolved questions in the case because of
the "unreliability and ever-changing nature of Wikipedia," the fact
that Juror 177 did not retain his original printout, the government's
failure to establish whether the Wikipedia entry could be "retraced,"
the discrepancies in the jurors' testimony, and the restraints imposed
by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b)." However, despite these
unresolved questions, the government had the very high burden of
rebutting the Remmer presumption "by showing that 'there [was] no
reasonable possibility that the verdict was affected by the' external
influence, "161 and it failed to do so.162
In considering the Mayhue factors, the court was limited in its
analysis by Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).16 3 In fact, "[a] trial judge
will rarely be able to ascertain the actual prejudicial impact of a jury's
exposure to external influences because a juror cannot testify
regarding the subjective effect of such influences during a Rule 606(b)
hearing." 6" Therefore, if the courts are to maintain this test, it is
essential that they do a thorough analysis and consider all the facts
and circumstances objectively to ensure a proper balance.'1 On the
other hand, review of the use of these factors in Lawson demonstrates
a need to limit the presumption of Remmer, or it should at least
encourage the courts to consider a different test to determine whether
the presumption has been rebutted, since Rule 606(b) makes it nearly
impossible for the government to succeed. This is especially true in
Lawson because even though the district court concluded that the
jury could have decided the case on an alternate theory of liability,
Juror 185's testimony to that extent "goes far beyond the bounds of
the limited exceptions provided in [the rule]." 66
159. Id. at 650-51 (citing Bing Shun Li v. Holder, 400 F. App'x 854, 857-58 (5th Cir.
2010); Badasa v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 909, 910-11 (8th Cir. 2008); Crispin v. Christian
Audigier, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 2d 965, 977 (C.D. Cal. 2010); Kole v. Astrue, No. CV 08-0411,
2010 WL 1338092, at *7 n.3 (D. Idaho Mar. 31, 2010); Baldanzi v. WFC Holdings Corp.,
No. 07-CIV-9551, 2010 WL 125999, at *3 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2010); Campbell ex rel.
Campbell v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 69 Fed. Cl. 775, 781 (Fed. Cl. 2006)).
160. Id. at 651.
161. Id. (quoting United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 142 (4th Cir. 1996)).
162. Id.
163. See Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 923 (10th Cir.
1992).
164. Id.
165. See id. at 923-24.
166. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 647.
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The first Mayhue factor was correctly decided in favor of
Lawson, because neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit
could dispute that "sponsor" was an important word in the case, since
it was an element of the offense with which Lawson was charged. 67
Because the definition in this case was taken from Wikipedia rather
than a standard dictionary, the second factor brought out a unique
circumstance in this case in that the definition had been changed from
the time the juror first consulted it to the time of the hearing.168 Thus,
the Fourth Circuit was persuaded to balance this factor in Lawson's
favor as well, despite the findings of the district court that the essence
of the Wikipedia definition was consistent with what it would have
provided to the jury upon request.'6 9 An interesting point is that the
Fourth Circuit failed to directly address the district court's finding
that "[gliven the meaning which Juror 177 seems to have derived
from the definition .. . any meaning germane to this action which may
be drawn from the definition has remained unchanged," 170 except to
dismiss it breezily as "highly speculative.""'
The court could not fully analyze the third factor-" '[t]he extent
to which the jury discussed and emphasized the definition' "-without
encountering Rule 606(b).172 Although the court did not explicitly
mention Rule 606(b) in its analysis of this factor, it also gave little
weight to the district court's finding that "the jurors ... placed little
emphasis on the Wikipedia definition obtained by Juror 177," even
after stating it agreed with this finding."' This was likely because, as
the court pointed out, there were some discrepancies among the
jurors in their testimony during the hearing.7 4 Some of the
discrepancies were likely the result of the limitations on the testimony
because of Rule 606(b), since the jurors could not share any details of
their mental processes during deliberation and the extent to which the
definition provided by Juror 177 influenced their decisions. However,
despite these limitations, the district court concluded that "[t]he only
167. See id.; United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *15
(D.S.C. July 19, 2010), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629.
168. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 648.
169. Id.
170. See id.; Dyal, 2010 WL 2854292, at *16.
171. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 648.
172. Id. (quoting Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp. of Wichita, Inc., 969 F.2d 919, 924 (10th
Cir. 1992)).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 649.
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other jurors who were made aware of Juror 177's external research
recalled only his reference to the word 'sponsor.' ""
With regard to both the second and third factors, the court gave
little weight to the district court's analysis and conclusions that these
factors showed a lack of prejudice."1 6 While the standard of review is
something akin to abuse of discretion, it is a narrowed version that
allows the appellate court to have " 'more latitude to review the trial
court's conclusion in this context than in other situations.' "17
Notably, the courts in other circuits that have held the Remmer
presumption to be inapplicable to the unauthorized use of a
dictionary have been far more deferential to the district court's
conclusions in terms of whether the use was prejudicial. For example,
in United States v. Cheyenne," the Eighth Circuit gave "substantial
weight to the trial court's appraisal of the prejudicial effects of
extraneous information on the jury, since the trial judge has the
advantages of close observation of the jurors and intimate familiarity
with the issues at trial.""' The Fourth Circuit should have given more
deference to the findings of the district court in Lawson, where the
trial judge actually observed the demeanor and expressions of the
jurors as they testified about the use of the Wikipedia definition. Part
of the trouble with giving the district court more deference here was
that the court had to work around the limitations of Rule 606(b),
which prevented it from considering some of the testimony from the
jurors about how they made their decision in the case and what
theory of liability they found most convincing. 180 Essentially, because
of Rule 606(b), the Fourth Circuit had to ignore the district court's
findings that the Internet research by Juror 177 did not affect the
jury's decision to convict the defendants."'
175. Dyal, 2010 WL 2854292, at *16.
176. See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 647-49.
177. Id. at 639 (quoting United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 140 (4th Cir. 1996)).
178. 855 F.2d 566 (8th Cir. 1988).
179. Id. at 568.
180. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 651 ("These conclusions reflect the fact that there remain
many unresolved questions in this case due to the unreliability and ever-changing nature
of Wikipedia, to Juror 177's failure to retain a copy of the printout containing the entry he
examined, to the government's failure to establish whether the entry could be 'retraced,'
to the differences between Juror 177's recollection of the events at issue and the
recollections of his fellow jurors, and to the constraints imposed by [Rule] 606(b).").
181. United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295s-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *16 (D.S.C.
July 19, 2010) ("[T]he court finds that there was no more than a mention of a single
excerpt from the definition of sponsor (or example drawn from that definition) which
might have influenced the jury in any way."), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. Lawson, 677
F.3d 629.
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In analyzing the strength of the evidence, the Fourth Circuit took
a more narrow approach by considering only the evidence of one
theory of liability, the one containing the sponsorship element, and
concluded that the government failed to present a meaningful
argument on the issue of whether Lawson was a "sponsor" in an
animal fighting venture.182 In looking at whether the jury was having
difficulty reaching a verdict before the introduction of the definition
of "sponsor," the court stated that "the issue whether the jury
convicted Lawson under an aiding and abetting theory cannot be
resolved in this case without inviting improper speculation and
violating the general prohibition of Rule 606(b)."' This factor
demonstrates the difficulty the government faces in rebutting the
presumption of prejudice.
The court's analysis of the final factor distinguishes this case
from other cases where a juror has used a conventional dictionary to
research a term related to the case. In this case, the juror conducted
his unauthorized research on Wikipedia, an online resource written
by anonymous Internet users who write for free.1" The court
observed that it was not the first federal court to be concerned about
Wikipedia's lack of reliability given its open-access nature,' while
also admitting in a footnote that it had cited to definitions from
Wikipedia in three prior opinions."a6 This factor demonstrates that
while this case might have been properly decided, a different outcome
might have been appropriate had the juror used a conventional
dictionary instead of Wikipedia. Rather than holding that the
unauthorized use of Wikipedia to research an important term in the
case implicates a presumption of prejudice, however, the court held
that the presumption applies to the use of "a dictionary or similar
resource. "1' The holding was broader than necessary, especially when
much of the potential for prejudice arose because the juror used a
resource like Wikipedia that is inherently less reliable than a
conventional dictionary.
In sum, the analysis of the Mayhue factors in light of the
restrictions imposed by Rule 606(b) leads to much ambiguity in
determining whether the government has rebutted the presumption
182. See Lawson, 677 F.3d at 649.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 650.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 650 n.28.
187. Id. at 645.
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arising from juror misconduct.' While the first and fifth factors more
clearly weighed in favor of Lawson under the circumstances of the
case, the second, third, and fourth factors favored Lawson only
because of the uncertainties presented in this case, which can be
attributed, at least partially, to the limited nature of the jurors'
testimony allowed at a postverdict hearing due to Rule 606(b). The
analysis is so limited that it warrants encouraging the courts to
consider whether this test is the best method for determining whether
the government rebutted the Remmer presumption. A better solution
is to limit the application of the Remmer presumption to egregious
jury misconduct, since a presumption would be so difficult for either
side to rebut in light of the limitations placed on the jurors' testimony
by Rule 606(b)."I
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, there is little doubt the Supreme Court intended
the continued application of the Remmer presumption under certain
circumstances.190 The situation in Remmer, where a third party made
direct contact with a juror, may necessitate a presumption of
prejudice because that third party has purposely injected himself or
herself into the jury deliberations. However, in light of the restrictions
imposed on jury testimony by the enactment of Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b) and the subsequent decisions in Phillips and Olano,
the Fourth Circuit in Lawson should have concluded, as several other
circuits have, that the Remmer presumption is limited to situations of
egregious juror misconduct."' Using Wikipedia to perform outside
research does constitute juror misconduct, which the district court
recognized." Even so, the district court concluded, based on all the
evidence against the defendants and based on testimony by the jurors,
that Juror 177's research into the definition of "sponsor" did not
actually prejudice the defendants.193 Innovations in technology, like
the creation of websites such as Wikipedia, have changed our world,
and the law must adapt to these changes.194 The increased availability
188. See id. at 651.
189. See supra notes 92-96 and accompanying text.
190. See supra Part II.
191. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also Kerr, supra note 65, at 1480
n.218 (discussing the fact that the circuit split on the presumption issue essentially means
that a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights depend on where he happens to live).
192. See United States v. Dyal, No. CR. 3:09-1295-CMC, 2010 WL 2854292, at *17
(D.S.C. July 19, 2010), rev'd in relevant part sub nom. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629.
193. See id.
194. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
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of information accessed by devices that fit in our pockets means that
juror misconduct, like that found in Lawson, will become more and
more frequent."' If courts attach a presumption of prejudice to this
type of misconduct, there is a strong likelihood of an increase in the
number of mistrials as well.196
By applying the presumption to a case like Lawson, or any case
where the extraneous influence had little or no effect on the
deliberations, courts are practically guaranteeing a costly mistrial
because the government cannot realistically rebut the presumption
without violating Rule 606(b).1 97 Narrowing the presumption to cases
involving serious misconduct that is very likely to have prejudiced the
jury will ensure that jury verdicts will not be second-guessed in cases
where the verdict was clearly supported by the evidence. It would also
ensure that technicalities like the mere use of a conventional or
online dictionary by a single juror will not impede the search for
justice in criminal cases such as Lawson, where "the evidence against
each of the Defendants ... [is] strong."1 9 8
The trial court should be given broad discretion to look closely at
alleged juror misconduct and determine the effect of that misconduct
on the verdict.199 Even if the presumption should apply to cases
involving a juror's unauthorized external research on Wikipedia,
because of its user-generated nature, the court should consider that
the current use of the Mayhue factors to determine if the government
has rebutted the presumption makes it nearly impossible for the
government to rebut this presumption in light of Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b)." Therefore, if it continues to apply the Remmer
presumption, the court should seek other means of applying the
presumption and determining whether it has been rebutted. Rather
than applying an exclusive list of factors, the court should take a less
constricted approach and consider the facts on a case-by-case basis to
determine if the government has rebutted the presumption. Further,
the appellate court should be more willing to give deference to the
trial court's findings, as the Fourth Circuit failed to do here,
195. See supra notes 135-38 and accompanying text.
196. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
198. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 649 (4th Cir. 2012).
199. For example, the D.C. Circuit has said that "[a]lthough often referring to Remmer,
this court has in fact not treated the supposed 'presumption' as particularly forceful, but
rather has accepted the necessity of focusing on the specific facts of the alleged contact,
and, as a result, has found broad discretion in the trial court to assess the effect of alleged
intrusions." United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496-97 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
200. See supra Part III.B.
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particularly on the issue of the strength of the evidence against the
defendants. By taking a less rigid view on the Remmer presumption, a
court would ideally prevent unnecessary retrials in cases such as
Lawson, where the evidence against the defendant was strong and the
evidence indicated that the jury did not even consider the extraneous
influence in reaching its verdict.
ANNA H. TISON
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